California (1978); U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit (1980); U.S. District Court for the Central District of California (1980); United States Supreme Court (1984); United States District Court for Colorado (1998); United States District Court for the Eastern District of California (2004).
Held to be expert in civil rights litigation:
Judge Ferdinand F. Fernandez, U.S. Ct. of Appeals, Ninth Circuit: "It is undisputed that counsel for plaintiffs [has] substantial experience in civil rights litigation. Indeed, [Marion Yagman is] truly expert."
Judge Mariana R. Pfaelzer, U.S. Dist. Ct., Central California: “Marion Yagman [is] acknowledged to be expert in § 1983 cases."
Judge Robert M. Takasugi, U.S. Dist. Ct., Central California: "[Marion Yagman's] performance in trial [was] exemplary ...."
Judge Mariana R. Pfaelzer, U.S. Dist. Ct., Central California: “Marion R. Yagman . . . is . . . a highly experienced, skilled, and effective federal civil rights lawyer.” “The results [she] obtained . . .were excellent in that a verdict enforcing an important constitutional right under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . ultimately was affirmed by the [Supreme Court].” “[She] also served the public interest by vindicating important, first-order constitutional rights.”
Judge J. Spencer Letts, U.S. Dist. Ct., Central California: "In this case, the role of the plaintiffs' attorney [Marion Yagman] as a private attorney general was maximized. ... [T]he case exposed to public view the LAPD's questionable alleged practice of surveilling persons suspected of violent crimes and then watching, without intervening, the suspects commit another crime before arresting them. ... The case may also be thought by some to have provided an illustration of the 'code of silence' ... since the testimony of all twenty-one officers who participated in the ... surveillance ... did not conflict on any material issue. The case also showed, in spite of the convincing nature of the evidence summarized above, how difficult it is for plaintiffs who are undeniably serious wrongdoers to get a jury verdict in their favor, and how nearly impossible it is for them to obtain a significant economic recovery.
“The court doubts that any lawyer in the greater Los Angeles area, other than plaintiffs' lead counsel [Marion R. Yagman], would or could have represented them in this case, and devoted the time, effort and skill which it took to produce the verdict."
Judge Richard A. Paez, U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit: “[plaintiff’s] success is attributed in large measure to the skill and experience of his counsel [Marion R. Yagman]. [Marion R. Yagman] ha[s] extensive experience in litigating § 1983 claims against police officers and public officials. [She is an] experienced trial attorney and appellate advocate[,] [and t]he large number of cases [she] ha[s] litigated to judgment and [her] many successes is graphic evidence of Marion R. Yagman’s abilities and tenacity.”
Judge J. Spencer Letts, U.S. Dist. Ct., Central California: “the court will accept as reasonable for plaintiff’s lead counsel [Marion R. Yagman] a rate of $450 [for work done in 1995] an hour, near the top of the range, because it appears that by virtue of her expertise in this area, counsel was able to expend comparatively few hours.”
1982-present, practice limited to federal civil rights/police misconduct litigation, including appeals.
Southwestern University School of Law: J.D., 1978.
Barnard College, Columbia University: B.A., English Literature, magna cum laude, Honors of the Graduating class in English Literature.
Los Angeles Criminal Courts Bar Ass'n, President's Award, presented February 27, 1993: "In recognition of [Marion R. Yagman's] zealous and dedicated advocacy and protection of her clients' rights she has battled courageously against abuse of governmental power at the risk of great personal sacrifice and loss."
Peoples College of Law, Clarence Darrow Award, presented March 30, 1996: "for ... renowned progressive legal advocacy, ... commitment to pro bono work and ... tireless involvement in diverse political and human rights efforts at local, national and international levels.” “Throughout the l970’s, the l980’s and now into the l990’s Marion Yagman ha[s] been engaged in progressive legal advocacy [and] ha[s] ... established legal precedent that has secured benefits to us all.” “All of Los Angeles, and indeed the legal community across the nation, can be grateful for the dedication and hard work that has been the hallmark of Marion Yagman’s practice.”
State of California Senate, Certificate of Recognition, presented March 30, l996: “for your commitment and leadership on constitutional rights to all citizens and engagement in progressive legal advocacy.” Presented by State Senator Hilda L. Solis.
City of Los Angeles, Certificate, presented March 30, l996: “For your extraordinary commitment, responsible stewardship and numerous contributions and service to others, this certificate is a measure of your devotion and labor which has enhanced the quality of life for everyone and made our society a better place in which to live.” Presented by City of Los Angeles Council member Jackie Goldberg (a defendant in the Gomez case, infra).
*Asterisked cases indicate cases of first impression or landmark cases.
Aisenberg v. Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office, 325 F.Supp.2d 1336 (M.D. FL 2004): in Bivens/section 1983 action against, inter alia, federal prosecutors for allegedly fabricating evidence against criminal defendants against whom criminal charges were dismissed, court found prosecutors entitled to prosecutorial immunity and remanded section 1983 claims to state court, in which those claims originally had been filed before federal prosecutors had petitioned for removal to federal court. (False prosecution case.)
Albiso v. Block, 53 F.3d 1357 (9th Cir. 1995) (table): reversed district court grant of a directed verdict and reinstated excessive force claim of state law enforcement officer who was arrested and subjected to force by county sheriff's deputies based on bogus claim of person whom state official was trying to serve with subpoena. (Excessive force/false arrest case.)
Alexander v. Melekian, 210 F.3d 381 (9th Cir. January 21, 2000)(table): it was permissible for Pasadena police to stop, order to his knees in the street, and hold in handcuffs for 15 minutes a 55-year-old African American man, because a shooting has occurred a mile away from the man’s residence which he was seen leaving on his way to work, and because the description of the shooter was that he was a black man in a similar model Ford Aerostar van. (Illegal stop/false arrest case.)
Armster v. City of Riverside, 611 F. Supp. 103 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (Armster I) second case in federal courts and first case in California federal courts in which it was held that police who stand by and observe civil rights violations and who take no action to prevent those violations may be held liable for damages caused by those violations. (Excessive force case.)
Avalos v. Baca, 2006 WL 2294878 (C.D. Cal. 2006): order denying summary adjudication of issues, and demonstrating how a plaintiff’s preemptive summary adjudication can force defendants to make discovery and can foreclose a defense summary judgment motion: “summary adjudication of these issues (in either the Plaintiff or the Defendant’s favor) is inappropriate.”
(Jail over-detention class action currently on appeal.)
Bell v. Gates, 2001 WL 849640 (C.D. Cal. 2001): setting forth pleading standards in section 1983 actions, and stating proposition that the “standard [for pleading conspiracy claims] is not intended to be difficult to meet.” (False arrest case.)
Bell v. Gates, 2001 WL 1295390 (C.D. Cal. 2001): setting forth pleading standards in section 1983 actions, and addressing pleading in the context of pleading and striking affirmative defense of statute of limitations. (False arrest case.)
Benas v. Baca, 2001 WL 485168 (C.D. Cal. 2001): holds that California sheriffs are county, and not state, officials, and therefore properly may be sued suable for damages in federal courts and do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity from damages suits in federal courts. (Excessive force case.)
Benas v. Baca, 30 Fed.Appx. 753 (9th Cir. 2002)(table): summarily affirming district court disposition, immediately above, based on Brewster v. Shasta County, 275 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2001), see infra. (Excessive force case.)
Benas v. Baca, 2003 WL 21530209 (C.D. Cal. 2003): enforces the so-called “advocate witness prohibition rule” and holds that (defense) counsel who interacts with potential trial witness such that counsel renders himself a witness must be disqualified from appearing as advocate at trial before jury; enforces Cal. Rule Prof. Conduct 5-210. (Excessive force case.)
Benas v. Baca, 2003 WL 21692037 (C.D. Cal. 2003): further explains and enforces the so-called “advocate witness prohibition rule” and holds that (defense) counsel who interacts with potential trial witness such that counsel renders himself a witness must be disqualified from appearing as advocate at trial before jury, and holds that other member of firm of disqualified lawyer may appear before jury at trial; enforces Cal. Rule Prof. Conduct 5-210. (Excessive force case.
Benas v. Baca, 2003 WL 21697750 (C.D. Cal. 2003): delineates Rule 72(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., standards, supernumerary rule regarding interrogatories, and rule with regard to whether interrogatories withdrawn before they are answered count against limitation on number of interrogatories. (Excessive force case.)
Benas v. Baca, 159 Fed.Appx. 762 (9th Cir. 2005): reversing summary judgment on excessive force claim, alleged unlawful entries and searches of residence claims, and Monell supervisorial claim against defendant Baca, on the ground that substantial, genuinely disputed issues of material fact prevented summary judgment. Appeal focuses on and discusses issue of most important force factor, immediate threat; holding that when force is “so severe [in this case a closed-fist punch to the face of a woman on whose chest an officer was sitting] it precludes summary judgment in view of the material facts in dispute.” (Force and search case.)
Berry v. Gates, 956 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1992) (table), holding that offers of proof must be very specific. (Excessive force case.)(Death squad case.)
Berry v. Gates, 2001 WL 849639 (C.D. Cal. 2001): setting forth pleading standards in section 1983 actions, and stating proposition that the “standard [for pleading conspiracy claims] is not intended to be difficult to meet.” (False arrest case.)
Berry v. Gates, 2001 WL 1295403 (C.D. Cal. 2001): setting forth pleading standards in section 1983 actions, and addressing pleading in the context of pleading and striking affirmative defense of statute of limitations. (False arrest case.)
Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2004): reversing summary judgment and setting forth new, expansive basis for holding liable under Monell a government entity for inaction based on failure to implement or faulty implementation of customs or policies, in this case customs or policies that resulted in overdetentions of three plaintiffs whose releases had been ordered by judges. The court held that a section 1983 plaintiff need not challenge any specific custom or policy, and may challenge in toto the manner in which policies are implemented. (Over-detention case, Monell case.)
In Re Boeh, Gomez v. Gates, 25 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 1994): held that civil rights plaintiff may not subpoena F.B.I. agent to testify in civil rights case unless plaintiff complies with C.F.R. administrative provisions that were held to supersede inherent power of federal district court to enforce its subpoenas and to compel testimony. (Excessive force case, see Gomez and Trevino, infra.)(Death squad case.)
Bohunis v. Gross, 963 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1992) (table): district court erred by excluding from Schmerber instruction factor that, notwithstanding that a blood/alcohol extraction is done in a medically-approved manner, the use of excessive force to make the extraction is unconstitutional, and erred by instructing jury that probable cause for arrest existed and extraction was made to preserve "only evidence of intoxication" when each of these matters was, in fact, a contention of the defendants. (Excessive force case.)
Branscome v. City of Paramount, 785 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1986) (table), affirming award of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. (Illegal motor vehicle stop case.)
Brooks v. Cook, 874 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1989) (table), reversing directed verdict in favor of defendants. (Excessive force case.)
Brooks v. Cook, 938 F.2d 1048 (9th Cir. 1991): (after remand) neither defense counsel nor the court in a Section 1983 action may make the jury aware of the possibility that a prevailing plaintiff may be entitled to an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988 (1982). A case of first impression, nationally. (Excessive force case.)
Brooks v. Cook, 28 F.3d 105 (9th Cir. 1994) (table): shoving suspect into side of his own car because he did not exit quickly enough for police does not, as a matter of law, constitute use of excessive force; and since law of reasonable suspicion to make a Terry stop changed since last appellate decision (in which it was held facts of stop could be actionable), defendant officers now are entitled to affirmative defense of qualified immunity because their actions in making stop, in light of law established after the stop, entitled them to immunity. (Excessive force and false arrest case.)
*Brown v. Baden, 796 F.2d 1165 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom. Real v. Yagman, 484 U.S. 963 (1987) (co-counsel with Ramsey Clark and Lawrence Schilling): all-inclusive, lump-sum sanction against attorney for misconduct is impermissible; certain types of statements constituted non-actionable opinion under First Amendment. Request to recuse Judge Real granted. (Diversity, defamation action.)
Byrd v. Guess, 137 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Byrd v. Cantu, 525 U.S. 963 (1998): successors in interest to person shot to death by police forfeit their claim in which they stand in deceased’s shoes to assert deceased’s excessive force claim, if successors do not, in addition to pleading they are wife and parent of deceased, also plead the words “successors in interest” in their complaint; standard of culpability for family members’ claims that their deceased was subjected to excessive force is to be evaluated under Fourteenth Amendment “deliberate indifference” test, rather than under Graham v. Connor Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” test. (Excessive, deadly force, death case.)
Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 644 F. Supp. 1352 (C.D. Cal. 1986) cited and adopted by Ninth Circuit in Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 559 (9th Cir. 1987): when a statute of limitations is shortened, one seeking to assert a claim governed by the shortened statute is entitled to sue on that claim either within the period of the original statute or within the entire period of the shortened statute, whichever period ends first. (Jail suicide, lack of medical care case.)
*Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 644 F. Supp. 1352 (C.D. Cal. 1986) cited and adopted by Ninth Circuit in Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 559 (9th Cir. 1987): when a statute of limitations is shortened, one seeking to assert a claim governed by the shortened statute is entitled to sue on that claim either within the period of the original statute or within the entire period of the shortened statute, whichever period ends first. (Jail suicide, lack of medical care case.)
*Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated sub nom. County of Los Angeles v. Cabrales, 490 U.S. 1087 (1989), reinstated, 886 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1989); 875 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1989) (fee order); cert. denied, 494 U.S. 2425 (1990); cert. denied, 496 U.S. 924 (1990): first case in which Los Angeles County jail system held legally liable for suicide of a prisoner, and in which the following points of law were established: appellate standard of review for findings of fact is clearly erroneous standard; clear error must be based on "definite and firm" conviction that trial court has made a mistake; court will strictly construe condition precedent requirement to motion for j.n.o.v. directed verdict motion must have been made at close of all evidence, and failure to meet condition precludes appeal on sufficiency of evidence grounds absent plain error which would result in miscarriage of justice, which means there must be absolutely no evidence to support verdict; in order to grant summary judgment there must be no genuine issues of material fact; evidentiary decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion; appellate standard on admission of expert testimony is whether trial court's decision was manifestly erroneous; experts need not have personal knowledge of facts in order to give expert opinion; there is no respondeat superior in Section 1983 cases; to prove custom and policy against government, an affirmative link between policy and wrong must be proved; governmental liability may be predicated on one instance of misconduct if it is shown that the violation is a product of an unconstitutional policy; prison officials are deliberately indifferent to prisoners' medical or psychiatric needs if the conditions they create are such that the prisoners are unable to have access to medical staff, or if access has no real meaning because the staff are not competent; the Fourteenth Amendment applies to pretrial detainees, but has an Eighth Amendment standard; omissions may be a basis for deliberate indifference, as well as commissions; neglect of psychiatric needs constitutes deliberate indifference; medical understaffing at a jail constitutes deliberate indifference; jury instruction wording is subject to an abuse of discretion appellate standard of review; a totality of what employees do or do not do may show deliberate indifference; statutes of limitations provide substantive rights, and state statutes, as well as tolling provisions apply in federal civil rights cases; attorney's fees awards are reviewed with a mixed standard. (Jail suicide, lack of medical care case.)
*Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 935 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1991): a plaintiff who ultimately prevails in a Section 1983 action is entitled to an award of all of his or her attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988, including attorneys' fees incurred for intermediate stages of the litigation at which that plaintiff did not prevail. A case of first impression, nationally. (Jail suicide, lack of medical care case.)
Cazares v. Sanchez, U.S. District Court for the Central District, No. CV-99-12812. Section 1983 case for illegal strip search and body cavity search. City of Pomona changed policy of indiscriminately strip searching arrestees following settlement for significant damages to the one plaintiff in this action.
Children Who Want an Education v. Wilson, 54 F.3d 599 (9th Cir. 1995) (order re procedure on appeal and on motions to consolidate and to expedite appeals), 59 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 1995): district court correctly applied abstention law for purposes of granting a preliminary injunction against California's implementation of Proposition 187 (a voter initiative barring a plethora of government services to undocumented inhabitants of California). (Equal protection case.)(The proposition 187, anti-immigrant case.)
Children Who Want an Education v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995): on summary judgment, declaring most parts of Proposition 187 to be unconstitutional. (Equal protection Case)(The Proposition 187, anti-immigrant case.)
Children Who Want an Education v. Wilson, 997 F.Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1997): final decision (of case immediately above) declaring most parts of Proposition 187 to be unconstitutional by virtue of federal preemption. (Equal protection Case)(The Proposition 187, anti-immigrant case.)
Chuman v. Wright, 980 F.2d 736 (9th Cir. 1992)(table): denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity ground that, because plaintiffs could not state which of raiding officers actually inflicted damage, all officers were immune, affirmed. (Raid case.)
Chweya v. Yaroslavsky, 2002 WL1316484 (9th Cir. 2002): summarily affirming denial of motion to dismiss Los Angeles County supervisors based on their claims of absolute and qualified immunities. (False arrest case; issue of indemnification of punitive damages.)
Chweya v. Baca, 65 Fed. Appx. 598 (9th Cir. 2003): order dismissing appeal on ground of, and discussing, appealability of final orders. (Appellate jurisdiction, false arrest case.)
Chweya v. Baca, 130 Fed.Appx. 865 (9th Cir. 2005): reversing district court on malicious prosecution claim. Case settled. on remand.
Choi v. Gaston, 220 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2000). Significant racial profiling case in which court, holding that "[a] custom of treating 'all Asians' alike would be intolerable," reversed district court on issue of whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Choi or probable cause to arrest him, or instead acted on the basis of racial profiling. Case settled on remand.
City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (1986): In a bifurcated officer liability/Monell liability Section 1983 action, the "deprivation of federal right" predicate for proceeding in the Monell phase requires that the plaintiff prevail in the liability phase against the defendant officer. (Excessive force case.)
Cornwell v. City of Riverside, 896 F.2d 398 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1026 (1990): California Government Code Section 825(b), permitting indemnification of punitive damages awarded against a defendant in a civil rights action, may be applied to permit indemnification over objection of plaintiff. (Excessive force case.)
*Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1991): a civil rights plaintiff who is in utero at the time police kill his or her parent may sue those police under Section 1983 once he or she is born. The claim under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause for deprivation of the liberty interest to the familial right of having a parent accrues not when the wrongful act that deprived one of a parent occurs, but rather when the harm of not having a parent occurs‑‑at the time of birth. A case of first impression, nationally. (Excessive force case.)(SIS death squad case.)
*Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 2000), as amended: reaffirming Trevino holding that there can be Section 1983 liability for rubber-stamping punitive damages indemnifications for police officers; holding that Heck v. Humphrey issue is not immediately appealable; denying qualified immunity to shooting officers in SIS; upholding potential liability of members of board of police commissioners under Section 1983. (Death squad, excessive force, qualified immunity case.)
*Cunningham v. Gates, 989 F. Supp. 1256 (C.D. Cal. 1997): summary judgment denied to members of LAPD death squad, with court finding that they potentially could be held liable for structuring arrest situation so that excessive force was likely to be used by them, and so that it was likely that when they used excessive force then they could claim defense of self-defense. (Deadly force case.)
D'Antignac v. Gates, 981 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1993)(table): district court has discretion not to award costs attendant to filing abstracts of judgment, and to order plaintiff to file satisfactions of judgment. (Search case.)(Dalton Avenue Raid.)
Deraddo v. Anaheim, 785 F.2d 315 (9th Cir. 1986) (table), reversing summary judgment in favor of defendants. (Excessive force case.)
Dooley v. Reiss, 736 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1038 (1984): first case to construe 42 U.S.C. 1985 to exclude from its ambit the giving of perjurious testimony in a federal action. (Illegal entry and search case.)
Elwell v. Gates, 2001 WL 185090 (C.D. Cal. 2001): in order for a child to state a section 1983 claim based on interference with child-parent relationship, child need not prove a permanent interference with relationship, and may prove a complete, though temporary, cessation of the relationship. (Wrongful conviction and incarceration of parent case.)
Erickson v. Knapp, 938 F. Supp. 581 (C.D. Cal. 1996): police may not seize camera from news photographer without probable cause to do so. (Unreasonable seizure case.)
Escobar v. Scutella, 97 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1996)(table): court of appeals overturned district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law on the issue of qualified immunity, after $285,000 jury verdict in plaintiff's favor on her unlawful arrest claim, and reinstated jury verdict, holding that court could not substitute its finding of objective reasonableness for the jury's finding that arrest was unreasonable because there was substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict; jury's finding of maliciousness, oppressiveness, and wantonness as predicate for award of $160,000 in punitive damages made impossible district judge's finding of objective reasonableness under Larez v. Holcomb, 16 F.3d 1513 (9th Cir. 1994), infra. (Arrest case.)
Fikes v. Cleghorn, 47 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1995): court need not instruct jury on three specific Graham v. Connor use of force factors as part of excessive force jury instruction. (Excessive force/police dog mauling case.)
Fleisher v. City of Signal Hill, 829 F.2d 1491 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988): overturning $175,000 jury verdict for terminated police officer, and holding that (1) probationary police officers do not have property interest in their employment, (2) police officer's privacy right does not extend to private sexual conduct, and (3) police officer's private sexual conduct is not protected by right of freedom of association. (Wrongful termination of police officer case.)
Fitzpatrick v. Gates, 2001 WL 630534 (C.D. Cal. April 18, 2001): Rampart scandal case, re-enforcing supervisorial liability, and holding that those without de jure, but with potential de facto supervisorial authority over police may be held liable for police misconduct. (Rampart scandal, false arrest case.) Case settled.
Forney v. Underhill, 785 F.2d 315 (9th Cir. 1986) (table): reversing summary judgment in favor of defendants. (Excessive force case.)
Forrett v. Richardson, 112 F.3d 416 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1049 (1998): jury determined that four police officers who shot unarmed, fleeing felon in the back, then-chief of police, government, and current chief of police were liable for using excessive force and having custom of excessive force, and awarded $180,000+ in punitive damages. Trial judge declared verdict was a miscarriage of justice, reversed, and alternatively granted a new trial. Appeals court affirmed, stating that second Garner prong, that dangerous fleeing felon could be subjected to deadly force applied, and that unless plaintiff had proved that police had set up an “escape proof cordon,” plaintiff could not prevail. (Excessive force case.)
Forsyth v. Block, U.S. District Court for the Central District of California case No. CV-98-7731. Section 1983 excessive force case against Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department sheriff’s deputy alleging excessive force. Case described as an instance of sheriff’s deputy misconduct in the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department 15th Semiannual Report by Merrick J. Bobb & Staff at 71. Case settled.
Fowler v. Block, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (C.D. Cal. 1998): It is unconstitutional for pre-trial detainees who have been ordered released by a court to be held in detention for purpose of running checks for warrants, wants, or holds, before release. (Over-detention, illegal seizure case.)
Fowler v. Block, 185 F.3d 866, 1999 WL 413476 (9th Cir. June 17, 1999)(table)(same as immediately preceding case): reversing Fowler v. Block, immediately above, on ground that neither district court nor court of appeals had sufficient records to determine qualified immunity issue. (Over-detention, illegal seizure case.)
Fugitt v. Tronstein, 807 F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1986) (table): district court refusal to instruct on punitive damages in premises liability case was not error. (Diversity, premises liability case.)
Galatz v. Franscell, 95 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1996)(table): the fact that civil rights plaintiff gave conflicting versions of events to police that led to arrest, is not issue preclusive on issue of truth or falsity in subsequent defamation action against defense counsel for police, who told press plaintiff admitted on the witness stand during the underlying civil rights trial that plaintiff had lied to the police; but, prior judge’s finding could be relied upon as basis to find defense counsel’s utterance to press was “substantially truthful.” (Defamation case.)
Gallagher v. City of West Covina, 2002 WL 826603 (C.D. Cal. 2002), setting forth standard for culpability for jail. Failure to provide medical care case, caused by LASD policy and practice of underfunding medical care. Includes court ruling that the LASD Semiannual Reports by Merrick J. Bobb are admissible evidence on summary judgment motion under Fed. R. Evid. Rule 803(8)(C) (prisoner lack of provision of medical care case.)
Gallagher v. City of West Covina, 2002 WL 1770761 (C.D. Cal. 2002): ruling in limine that section 1983 plaintiff’s prior misdemeanor and felony convictions, evidence of plaintiff’s alleged propensity for violence, and evidence of possible bias against police could not be introduced in evidence to impeach plaintiff. (Excessive force; jail deliberate indifference to serous medical needs; discovery case.)
Gallagher v. City of West Covina, 2002 WL 1836300 (C.D. Cal. 2002): ruling on motion in limine that evidence of post-incident conspiracy and cover-up is relevant and admissible to prove government’s reaction to incident and to support Monell claims, and ruling that potential prejudicial impact does not substantially outweigh probative value. (Excessive force; jail deliberate indifference; discovery case.)
Gallagher v. City of West Covina, 2002 WL 31059672 (C.D. Cal. 2002): ruling on motion in limine that prior evidence of bad acts and of other lawsuits is admissible as against government entity on Monell claim and supervisory liability claim because such is not prohibited by Fed. R. Evid. Rule 404(b), as government entity is not a “person.”
Gates v. Rivera, 993 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1993): character evidence normally is not admissible in civil rights action; evidence that police officer had prior clean record is inadmissible character evidence in civil rights action when intent is not in issue, but its admission is harmless error; test for harmless error standard set forth; prior consistent statements of witnesses are inadmissible hearsay in civil rights action. (Excessive force/death case.)
Gillen v. Gates, 847 F. Supp. 1475 (C.D. Cal. 1994): on attorneys' fees motion by prevailing Section 1983 plaintiff, district court held that it could use prevailing hourly rate in legal community for defense counsel to set same rate for plaintiff's counsel. (Subsequently overruled, sub silentio, in Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911 [9th Cir. 1996], cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1249 ).
Gillen v. Gates, 56 F.3d 71 (9th Cir. 1995) (table): upholding court, in case immediately above.
Gomez v. Gates, 804 F. Supp. 69 (C.D. Cal. 1992): fee order awarding 1.7 multiplier in death squad case against LAPD, with multiplier based on extreme undesirability of the case (for reasons set forth at page 2, [Judge Letts], above). (Excessive force case; Death Squad Case.)
Gorio v. Block, 972 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1992) (table): refusing to find inconsistency in special verdict in which three jurors voted there was excessive force, and three jurors voted there was no excessive force, thus preventing a unanimous verdict. Court found that finding of qualified immunity made any inconsistency immaterial. (Excessive force case.)
Green v. Baca, 2003 WL 23181015 (C.D. Cal. 2003): discovery order defining the scope of discovery and of undue burden on discovery. (Jail over-detention case.)
Green v. Baca, 219 F.R.D. 485 (C.D. Cal. 2003): setting forth standards on Rule 72(a), F.R. Civ. P., reconsideration motion on discovery, stating blanket assertion of privileges is inadequate, and holding detainee’s need for discovery sought regarding prior jail detentions of others outweighed any burden on defendant sheriff in producing such evidence. (Jail over-detention case; discovery case.)
Green v. Baca, 306 F.Supp. 903 (C.D. Cal. 2004): summary judgment not granted to sheriff defending against an over-detention section 1983 claim: Fourteenth Amendment standards govern; fact issues as to when release notice was received from state parole board by county jail prevent summary judgment; fact issues remain as to whether or not there was deliberate indifference, thus precluding summary judgment; and fact issues in dispute as to nonliability for delay in release preclude summary judgment.
Green v. Baca, 2004 WL 1151649 (C.D. Cal. 2004): order requiring massive discovery and holding claims of attorney client privilege to have been without any foundation; denying official information privilege; denying claim under attorney work product rule; ordering defendants to explain their misrepresentations to the court as a requisite to possible sanctions.
Green v. Baca, 2004 WL 1146595 (C.D. Cal. 2004): order denying defendant’s application for leave to file out-of-time second summary judgment motion; setting forth standards governing modification of Rule 16(b) scheduling order.
Green v. Baca, 2004 WL 1151618 (C.D. Cal. 2004): order denying application to stay magistrate judge’s discovery order on ground it properly should be presented to magistrate judge, who issued subject discovery order, in first instance.
Green v. Baca, 2004 WL 1151612 (C.D. Cal. 2004): magistrate judge’s order denying extension of time to comply with discovery order to provide time to seek Rule 72(a) reconsideration because Rule 72(a) reconsideration would have no merit.
Green v. Baca, 226 F.Supp. 2d 624 (C.D. Cal. 2004), order clarified, 2005 WL 283361: various holdings on motions in limine, denying bifurcation, calling sheriff to testify as witness.
*Green v. Baca, 225 F.R.D. 612 (C.D. Cal. 2005): order imposing $54,375.00 sanction on defense counsel for concealing 11,704 pages of documents regarding over-detentions in L.A. County jail.
Green v. Baca, 2005 WL 283361 (C.D. Cal. 2005): order discussing and clarifying Rule 45’s requirement that subpoenas need not be served in-hand.
Hammer v. Gross, 884 F. 2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1989), rehearing en banc granted, 902 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1990): it is constitutional to use physical force to compel a blood test to determine alcohol level. (Excessive force case.)
Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (reversing 884 F. 2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1989), supra): a police officer who stops a person based on alleged driving while intoxicated (1) may not administer a forced blood alcohol test when the arrestee agrees to take another form of test (breath), and (2) the Supreme Court's decision in Schmerber v. California does not permit the use of excessive force in administering a blood test, no matter if the test is performed pursuant to approved medical standards. Request for rehearing en banc by the entire 28-member 9th Cir. rejected; petition for certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 582 (1991). (Excessive force case.)
Hammer v. Gross, 24 F.3d 246 (9th Cir. 1994) (table): a district court can make a Section 1988 fees award without setting forth the numbers of hours compensated for or the hourly rate set if the appeals court can figure out from the record a close approximation of what the district court did. (Excessive force case.)
*Hawkins v. Baca, 114 F.Supp. 2d 987 (C.D. Cal. 2000): local legislators are neither absolutely nor qualifiedly immune from section 1983 damages if they rubber stamp indemnifications of punitive damages awarded against police. (Theft of legal materials from pre-trial detainee case.)
*Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1998): pending action against Los Angeles County judge, and others, for application of 50,000 volts of electricity, via a “stun belt,” against prisoner in courtroom, who, in representing himself, interrupted the judge, and then was subjected to torture by administration of stun belt shock. On November 16, 1998 court tentatively certified the case as a class action, and issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the placement of a stun belt on any defendants who appear in court. (International law violations, and violations of First Amendment [right to free speech], Fourth Amendment [right to be free from use of excessive force], Sixth Amendment [right to counsel and assistance of counsel in criminal cases], Eighth Amendment [right to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment], Fourteenth Amendment [rights to equal protection and due process of law] case of first impression, nationally).
Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 251 F.3d 1230 (9th Cir. Cir. 2001): stun-belt case; affirming certification of class, and affirming preliminary injunction; affirming in part and reversing in part case immediately above. (Excessive force, Sixth Amendment, First Amendment case.)
Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 2002 WL 227081 (C.D. Cal. 2002): dissolving preliminary injunction and de-certifying class (in case immediately above) upon compliance with injunction by changing allegedly unconstitutional stun-belt policy. (Excessive force, Sixth Amendment, First Amendment case.)
Hawkins v. Davis, 2000 WL 33936254 (C.D. Cal. 2000): pleading and standing case involving alleged, constitutionally impermissible surcharges on collect telephone calls by California prison inmates and alleged, unconstitutional surcharges on prisoners’ inmate accounts. denying motion to dismiss based on venue and for transfer based on inconvenient forum, setting forth standards. (Inmate telephone overcharge case.)
Heath v. Cast, 813 F.2d 254 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987). It is error to select alternate jurors by lot in violation of F. R. Civ. P. Rule 47(b); availability of issue preclusion is a mixed question of fact and law in which legal issues predominate and which is reviewed de novo; California State Court motions to suppress are not final judgments and do not support issue preclusion; F. R. Evid. Rule 403 requires relevancy of evidence to be substantially outweighed by prejudice for exclusion of relevant evidence; evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion; failure to give a warranted jury instruction is reviewed de novo; a court is not required to instruct jury in precise words chosen by party, so long as instructions allow jury to determine intelligently the issues presented; jury must be instructed on each element of case and must accurately reflect controlling law; and violation of discovery order is not appropriately sanctioned by exclusion of expert testimony when expert's report has been withheld by proponent of expert's testimony. (Excessive force case.)
Heller v. Bushey, 759 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. granted and rev'd sub nom. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (1986): defines elements of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, defines permissible scope of qualified immunity defense in Section 1983 action, defines class of defendants. (Excessive force case.)
Helmick v. Peasant Fare, 790 F.2d 85 (9th Cir.) (table), cert. denied sub nom. Helmick v. Launders, 479 U.S. 854 (1986): prosecutor entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken during search of premises while assisting fire investigators who were investigating suspicious fire. (Denial of equal rights case.)
Hernandez v. Gates, 100 F.Supp. 2d 1209 (C.D. Cal. 2000): taking opposite view to Cunningham v. Gates, supra, that government officials may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for rubber-stamping indemnifications of punitive damages for police. (Rampart scandal case.)
Hernandez v. Gates, 2001 WL 1403042 (C.D. Cal. 2001): pleading case setting forth rules of joinder under Rule 19, F.R. Civ. P. (Rampart scandal case, false charges case.)
Hernandez v. Gates, 2004 WL 291225 (C.D. Cal. 2004): denying order compelling compliance with service requirements of Rule 5(b), F.R. Civ. P., as inappropriate request for hypothetical relief. (Rampart scandal, false charges case.)
Hernandez v. Gates, 2004 WL 1146602 (C.D. Cal. 2004): ruling that, notwithstanding no showing of good cause so as to relieve plaintiff from the 120-day service of summons and complaint requirement of Rule 4(m), F.R. Civ. P., nevertheless, court will exercise its discretion to permit service over a year late because defendant timely had been served in and had been defending companion case that arises from the same facts and circumstances giving rise to the claim in this case, and holding any prejudice would be slight, so that giving leave would not eviscerate the statute of limitations’ purpose.
Hodnett v. Dearing, 802 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1986) (table): upholding dismissal of civil rights action founded on claim of negligent treatment of prisoner. (Excessive force case.)
Holt v. Block, U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, No. CV-97-6650.Section 1983 jail case alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Case settled. This case is described in the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department 11th Semiannual Report by Merrick J. Bobb as illustrating deputy sheriff defendants’ misconduct and deficient LASD Jail practices (Excessive force, failure to provide medical care).
Honn v. Tousley, 924 F. 2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1991) (table): chase of motor vehicle, traffic violation suspect by police that results in death of suspect in crash, entitles police to qualified immunity. (Excessive force case.)
Hunter v. Gates, 2001 WL 837697, RICO Bus. Disp. Guide 10,065 (C.D. Cal. 2001): interpreting Heck v. Humphrey not to apply to civil RICO claims. (Rampart scandal, false charges case.)
Hunter v. Gates, 2003 WL 21437629 (9th Cir. 2003)(table): holding time-barred Rampart plaintiff’s section 1983 claims, and refusing to rule on RICO claims, as time-barred also. (Rampart scandal case.)
Kendrick v. Baca, 141 Fed. Appx. 511 (9th Cir. 2005): in case involving a search warrant, court reverses summary judgment in favor of defendants based on an arrest for which no warrant existed and in which plaintiffs whose home was to be searched were arrested several blocks from their home. One plaintiff is an LAPD detective. (False arrest case.)
King v. Baca, 2001 WL 682793 (C.D. Cal. 2001): claims against county supervisor defendants for rubber-stamping indemnifications of punitive damages awarded against police may proceed. (Jail mistreatment case.)
*Klock v. Cain, 813 F. Supp. 1430 (C.D. Cal. 1993): there is no clearly-established right either to interstate travel or for a homeless person not to be taken outside city's limits by police, and therefore, police who take a homeless person outside a city's limits to rid the city of him do not violate that person's constitutional rights. (Excessive force and arrest case, case of first impression.)
Lake v. Baca, 2007 WL 2483509 (C.D. Cal. 2007): setting forth standards for motions for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to F.R. Civ. P. Rule 12(c); setting forth standards for Monell liability; setting forth criteria to prove a “custom” under Monell, to wit, one of “practices of sufficient duration, frequency, and consistency that conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy;” and “implementation of . . . policies that [was] . . . unreasonable.” (Over-detention case.) Case is on appeal.
Lang v. Gates, 36 F. 3d 73 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Yagman & Yagman, P.C. v. Gates, 513 U.S. 1017 (1994): on Section 1983 plaintiffs' application for Section 1988 attorneys' fees for work done after a Rule 68 offer was accepted by one of two plaintiffs and rejected by the other plaintiff, court ruled that plaintiff who accepted offer in fact would be considered to have rejected the offer by virtue of other plaintiff's rejection of offer, and, therefore, that since both plaintiffs were deemed to have rejected the offer, their counsel could not recover fees for work done after the offer that was deemed rejected by the plaintiff who accepted the offer. Also, for purposes of Rule 68, a dismissal after settlement is the functional equivalent of a judgment, and thus the word "judgment" in Rule 68 is construed to include the word "settlement." (Dalton Avenue Raid.)
*Larez v. City of Los Angeles, No. 87-3640-RMT, first case in which Los Angeles chief of police ever held liable for acts of his officers, and assessed $170,000 in punitive damages that he must personally pay. (Excessive force, raid, house trashing, illegal search case.)
Larez v. Gates, 946 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1991): affirming award of $90,000 compensatory damages against six LAPD CRASH officers in No. 87-3640-RMT, immediately above, and reversing award of $170,000 punitive damages against LAPD Chief Gates on ground that court erred in admitting in evidence inculpatory statements by Gates that were reported in the media, without requiring that the reporters who heard (and then reported upon) Gates' inculpatory statements to testify at trial. In rendering its decision the Court also made numerous points expanding and defining Monell liability; defining individual capacity liability for supervisorial employees and official capacity liability; prescribing the permissible allowance of awards of punitive damages; holding that a plaintiff in a civil rights action who prevails against police in the first half of a bifurcated trial still has a right to proceed in the second half of that trial against government officials both in their individual capacities and their official capacities; and explaining that both flawed investigations of police misconduct and failures to take remedial steps were bases for Section 1983 liability. (Excessive force, raid, house trashing, illegal search case.)
Larez v. Holcomb, 16 F.3d 1513 (9th Cir. 1994): affirming liability on issue of unlawful seizure; but reversing on issue of damages, and holding that a jury in a civil rights case may not be told that the government may indemnify police for either compensatory or for punitive damages. (Illegal arrest case.)
Luers v. Smith, 941 F. Supp. 105 (C.D. Cal. 1996): civil rights plaintiffs who wish to compel a governmental entity to relieve them from operation of California government code requiring presentation of a claim to public entity as precondition to bringing suit must do so in state court, and may not do so in federal court. (Death, shooting case.)
Linz v. City of Brea, 19 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994) (table): Section 1983 plaintiff who litigates in state court suppression hearing the issue of the way in which his blood was extracted for chemical analysis, may not later litigate excessive force issue in federal court, if he loses suppression motion in state court. (Excessive force case.)
Luke v. Abbott, 954 F. Supp. 202 (C.D. Cal. 1997): Section 1983 plaintiffs may not sue government officials in their official capacities when they have sued the governmental entity, because suit against officials is redundant. Further, if only the officials are sued, they may move to substitute in the governmental entity, and be dismissed themselves. It no longer is possible legally to sue government officials in their official capacities. No longer good law. (False warrant application case.)
Lyons v. Williams, 91 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1996): burden of proof on issue of consent in case in which female LAPD officer claimed she was raped by police commander/superior was on plaintiff to prove there was no consent, and not on defendant to prove there was consent. Petition for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing en banc denied. Petition for certiorari denied, 519 U.S. 1111 (1997). (Police on police, rape/excessive force case.)
McCall v. Bradley, 977 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1992) (table): affirming refusal to permit amendment to complaint to name additional Monell defendants. (Excessive force case.)
McCoy v. Launi, 831 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1987) (table), upholding dismissal based on statute of limitations. (Illegal entry, search case.)
Mendoza v. Block, 27 F.3d 1357 (9th Cir. 1994): police use of a police dog to subdue suspect was objectively reasonable, and hence officers were entitled to qualified immunity, because defendant would not come out from under bushes beneath which he was hiding. (Excessive force case.)
Miller v. City of Long Beach, 803 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. l986): right to seek Section l988 attorneys’ fees lies with plaintiff, and not with plaintiff’s attorney; civil rights action settlements may be conditioned on waiver of attorneys’ fees, absent showing that defendant has a policy or custom of requiring waiver of fees as a condition of settlement (which was not made in this case, thus permitting court not to rule on this issue).
Moreno v. Baca, 2001 WL 33356835 (C.D. Cal. 2000): court rules that claims against county supervisor defendant for rubber-stamping indemnifications of punitive damages awarded against police may proceed, and also rules that even when there is no de jure supervisorial authority over police, still there may be supervisorial liability when a supervisor is not precluded from creating a civilian review board to monitor police and fails to do so. (False arrest, malicious prosecution case.)
Moreno v. Baca, 2001 WL 1204113 (C.D. Cal. 2001): motion for judgment on pleadings based on collateral estoppel denied as premature, and interpreting possible collateral estoppel bar in light of failure of former criminal defendant, now plaintiff, to appeal from finding of probable cause to bind over at preliminary hearing, and who ultimately was found not guilty after jury trial. (False arrest, malicious prosecution case.)
Moreno v. Baca, 2002 WL 338366 (C.D. Cal. 2002): denying summary judgment based on qualified immunity and collateral estoppel, based on failure to litigate probable cause for arrest in criminal preliminary hearing. (False arrest case, malicious prosecution case.)
Moreno v. Baca, 2002 WL 434596 (C.D. Cal. 2002): granting summary judgment on indemnification claim when no evidence of indemnifications presented. (False arrest case, malicious prosecution case.)
Moreno v. Baca, 400 F. 3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2005): court upholds denial of qualified immunity to sheriffs who arrest parolee without knowing he was on parole and then attempt to use their after-acquired knowledge of plaintiff’s parole status to justify the arrest, and holds that parole condition of submission to warrantless arrest does not constitute agreement to submit to a suspicionless arrest, and that the Fourth Amendment applies to parole searches and seizures. (False arrest, malicious prosecution case.)
*Moreno v. Baca, 431 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied sub nom. Baca v. Moreno, 126 S.Ct. 2900 (2006): suspicionless arrest and search cannot be rendered reasonable retroactively by police officers’ subsequent discovery that arrestee was on parole and/or subject to outstanding warrant, and police were not entitled to qualified immunity on this issue. (False arrest case, malicious prosecution case.)
Mortimer v. Baca, 478 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (C.D. Cal. 2007): order granting defense summary judgment on plaintiffs' Monell claim of a policy, practice and custom ofover-detaining jail inmates, and decertifying over-detention class. (Class action for over-detentions of jail inmates.) Case on appeal.
Moss v. Gates, 2001 WL 739806 (C.D. Cal. 2001): claims against city council members and city attorney defendants for rubber-stamping indemnifications of punitive damages awarded against police may proceed. (Rampart scandal, false charges case.) Case settled.
Motley v. Parks, 383 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2004): reversing summary judgment in parole, police raid case, and setting forth both principles on summary judgment and rules that: there must be a parolee for there to be a parole search; pointing a gun may constitute excessive force; conducting a search in an overly-aggressive or harassing manner is unconstitutional; supervisory officers are responsible for seeing to it that searches are supported by proper legal cause, have a legal duty to check the factual basis for a search, and are liable if they fail to do so; supervisors are not free to believe stale information is accurate; all searching officers have a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation in order to conduct a search. (Illegal residential entry, excessive force case.)
Motley v. Parks, 401 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2005): order taking case en banc and vacating prior disposition.
*Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2005)(en banc): before conducting a warrantless search pursuant to a parolee’s search condition, police must have probable cause to believe that the parolee in fact is a resident of the house to be searched; it is not objectively reasonable for police to point a gun on a baby while searching. (Entry and force case.)
Mulgannon v. Gates, 972 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1992) (table): reversing defense verdict on ground that court injected police officer's subjective belief into qualified immunity defense, and ordering new trial. (First Amendment, seizure of press camera case.)
Mulgannon v. Gates, 61 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 1995) (table): reversing court's grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity after remand in 972 F.2d 1341, immediately above.
Murdock v. Stout, 54 F. 3d 1437 (9th Cir. 1995): affirming grant of summary judgment based on defense claim that exigent circumstances exception to search warrant requirement justified entry into home based on these facts: jogger told neighbor that a person was seen at 8:00 p.m. running out of plaintiffs' home (it was plaintiffs' son late for a date and getting into his girlfriend's waiting car); no one responded to police inquiry whether anyone was at home; back, sliding door was 8-10 inches ajar; television was on; can of Budweiser was on table near television; husband plaintiff was found asleep in his own bed with all of his clothing on and his hands under the covers; he was rousted from bed, quarreled with the invading police, who then identified him after searching his home. (Illegal entry/false arrest/illegal search case.)
Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 2001)(petition for rehearing en banc denied): re-affirming Trevino II and Cunningham, supra, that public officials who rubber-stamp indemnifications of punitive damages awarded against police in civil rights cases themselves may be held liable under section 1983. (Excessive force case.) Case settled.
Oborn v. Gates, 875 F. 2d 319 (9th Cir. 1989) (table), upholding denial of defendants' summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity. (Illegal search of and prosecution of police officer.)
Oborn v. Gates, 936 F. 2d 579 (9th Cir. 1991) (table): reversing directed verdict in Section 1983 action, and holding that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to decide that a civilian agent of LAPD was acting under color of law when she searched a disabled LAPD officer's home and removed personal articles and turned them over to LAPD internal affairs detectives waiting outside. (Illegal search of and prosecution of police officer.)
Oliverria v. Gates, 2001 WL 1472573 (C.D. Cal. 2001): pleading case setting forth rules of joinder under Rule 19, F.R. Civ. P. (Rampart scandal case, false charges case.)
Oliverria v. Gates, 2003 WL 251937 (C.D. Cal. 2003): pleading case setting forth rules for pleading conspiracy. (Rampart scandal case, false charges case.) Case settled.
Onossian v. Block, 103 F. 3d 140 (9th Cir. 1996)(table): police may be held liable legally under Section 1983, based on Fourteenth Amendment, for injuries to third party as a result of a police pursuit. (Police vehicular pursuit case, bystander plaintiff suffered catastrophic injuries.)
Onossian v. Block, 175 F. 3d 1169 (9th Cir. 1999): (same as immediately preceding case), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 498 (1999): affirming summary judgment for defendants on ground that defendants’ conduct did not rise to the new, “shocks the conscience” standard for police vehicular pursuit cases. (Police vehicular pursuit case, bystander plaintiff suffered catastrophic injuries.)
Palmerin v. City of Riverside, 794 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1986): where substance of evidentiary objection has been fully explored on hearing on motion in limine, objection need not be raised again during trial at time of introduction of evidence in order to preserve objection on appeal; a guilty plea to obstruction of justice is admissible against a plaintiff in a civil rights action against police defendants when the guilty plea and the civil rights action arose from the same factual circumstances: it is relevant to the issue of level of appropriate force used. (Excessive force case.)
Peraza v. Delameter, 722 F.2d 1455 (9th Cir. 1984): in Section 1983 action, evidence of prior bad acts is admissible to go to issue of damages when a plaintiff claims emotional distress from encounter with police. (Excessive force case.)
Pittman v. Smith, 210 F.3d 384 (9th Cir. 2000)(table): in a case in which plaintiff veteran’s administration chief of police claimed he was stopped and detained by Riverside County deputy sheriffs only because he was a black man, court ruled Terry stop jury instruction was adequate notwithstanding it did not inform jury that plaintiff needed to have engaged in actual conduct, beyond just sitting in his car, in order for there to have been reasonable suspicion required to stop plaintiff. (Illegal arrest case.)
Postma v. Waters, 934 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1991) (table): off-duty Los Angeles County undercover narcotics deputies could not be said to have been acting under color of state law when the allegedly took an intoxicated woman from a bar, raped her, mutilated her body, and then murdered her. (Death case.)
Postma v. Waters, 978 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1992) (table) (same as above case): evidence was sufficient to warrant denial of summary judgment to off-duty Los Angeles County deputy sheriff, who allegedly took intoxicated female from bar, had sex with her, murdered her, and then mutilated her dead body; grant of summary judgment reversed; district court's refusal to award sanctions upheld because case was not frivolous. Case remanded for trial. (Death case.)
Quintana v. Gates, 2001 WL 755409 (C.D. Cal. 2001): reversing prior order, and now affirming right to sue city council members for indemnification in bad faith of punitive damages. (Rampart scandal, false arrest and charges case.) Case settled.
Rippey v. Dopp, 2001 WL 1153479 (9th Cir. 2001)(table): affirming defense verdict in police pursuit, shooting death case.
Rivas v. Gates, 2001 WL 755417 (C.D. Cal. 2001): reversing prior order, and now affirming right to sue city council members for indemnification in bad faith of punitive damages. (Rampart scandal, false arrest and charges case.)
Rivas v. Gates, 2001 WL 1408245 (C.D. Cal. 2001): pleading case setting forth rules of joinder under Rule 19, F.R. Civ. P. (Rampart scandal case, false charges case.)
Rocha v. Baca, 2000 WL 1909474 (C.D. Cal. 2000): county supervisor defendants may be held liable for rubber-stamping indemnifications of punitive damages awarded against police, California sheriffs are county, and not state, officials for section 1983 purposes, and local court rule requiring meeting of counsel before filing of motion does not require providing opposing counsel with legal authority in support of proposed movants position. (Jail, excessive force case.) Case settled after trial.
Rocha v. Baca, 2002 WL 1008617 (9th Cir. 2002): affirming summarily denial of motion to dismiss that held county supervisor defendants may be held liable for rubber-stamping indemnifications of punitive damages awarded against police, California sheriffs are county, and not state, officials for section 1983 purposes, cert. denied sub nom. Burke v. Rocha, 2002 WL 1906756 (2002). (Jail, excessive force case.)
Salinas v. Cooke, 103 F.3d 140 (9th Cir. 1996)(table): when there is a conflict in evidence as to whether or not hog-tying a suspect and then placing him face down constitutes excessive force, then police are entitled to qualified immunity. (Excessive force case.)
Saman v. Robbins, 173 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1999): reversal of excessive force verdict in favor of completely innocent, bystander Jordanian national, who was kicked in chest by police officer who arrived at the scene of a police/citizen shooting, and who came upon plaintiff running from scene of shooting. Court gave as justification for reversing judgment in plaintiff’s favor that plaintiff, after having gotten to ground on police command, suddenly began to get up. Plaintiff could not speak English. (Excessive force case.)
Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2002): directed verdict improper where circumstantial evidence and inferences create issue of fact for jury. (Excessive force case.)
Seelig v. Parks, 2002 WL 981612 (C.D. Cal. 2002): denying summary judgment, based on ground that defendants had not established stop of plaintiff was a Terry stop because its duration may have been unduly long; and reports made by law enforcement personnel, to the extent they are based on the reporters personal knowledge may be admissible in evidence. (False stop and arrest case.)
Settles v. City of Signal Hill, 732 F.2d 164 (9th Cir. 1984) (table): reversing finding that plaintiff who prevailed in civil rights action by way of voluntary dismissal was prevailing party for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1988. (Defense of police officers in death case.)
Sherman v. Byrd, 83 F.3d 428 (9th Cir. 1996) (table): district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law on issue of reasonableness of manner of detention and arrest was erroneous. Female plaintiff’s being left handcuffed, clothed with only nightgown, whose straps were down, and whose breasts were exposed to her young son and to others who were detained en masse presented issue of fact for jury to determine reasonableness of detention. (Raid, search, arrest case.)
Shuker v. Block, 872 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1989) (table): reversing directed verdict in favor of defendants. (Excessive force, jail beating case.)
Shuker v. Block, 990 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1993) (table): (same as prior case) after remand on prior appeal tried to jury, and hung jury; third trial resulted in verdict of $35,000 compensatory damages and $65,000 punitive damages, plus award of $117,000 attorneys' fees, with punitive damages halved on remittitur. Both sides appealed, and judgment, as remitted, plus attorneys' fees upheld by appeals court. (Excessive force, jail beating case.)
Singletary v. Gates, 131 F.3d 148 (9th Cir. 1997)(table): upholding grant of summary judgment in illegal stop/arrest case, and finding legal cause for stop/arrest as a matter of law. (Illegal stop/arrest case.)
Standing Committee on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995) (co-counsel with Ramsey Clark and Lawrence W. Schilling): holding that Stephen Yagman had right to freedom of expression that prevented his being disciplined for uttering harshly negative criticism of U.S. Dist. Judge William Keller, calling him an anti-Semite and a drunk, and reversing Standing Committee on Discipline v. Yagman, 856 F. Supp. 1384 (C.D. Cal. 1994). (Attorney discipline, First Amendment, free speech case.)
Syfu v. Cooke, 2002 WL 453225 (C.D. Cal. 2002): denying summary judgment based on qualified immunity where facts presented by defendants were not sufficiently specific to warrant finding no genuine issues of material fact were in dispute. (Illegal detention case.)
Tapia v. Gates, 57 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1995) (table): upholds dismissal of Monell claim based on custom of excessive force in case in which plaintiff proved excessive force against LAPD officer who shot plaintiff, but failed to prove the off-duty officer acted under color of state law. Court held that plaintiff's Monell claim was both vague and not separate from the claim against the officer and that therefore trial judge did not abuse his discretion in not permitting the claim to go to a jury. (Excessive force/custom of excessive force case.)
Thomas v. Miller, 928 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1991) (table): Section 1983 claim for conspiracy may not be made unless there is an underlying violation of Section 1983; that is, there may not be a simple, non-racially-based civil rights conspiracy unless there is an actual violation of rights. (Excessive force case.)
Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 804 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1986) (table): equitable tolling is inapplicable to stop the running of the statute of limitations when police defendants had been named fictitiously in first action and had no notice it had been filed. (Excessive force case.)
*Thomas v. Baca, 514 F.Supp. 2d 1201 (C.D. Cal. 2007): granting summary adjudication of issue of the unconstitutionality of forcing jail inmates to sleep on floors without bunks, under both Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments, and of liability in 500,000 plus member class action against the Los Angeles County Jail system. (Prisoner case.)
Thorsted v. Kelly, 858 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1988): the issue of qualified immunity in Section 1983 cases is a fact-specific one which must be decided by a jury if the court first finds that the law with respect to the constitutional rights allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. (Request for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing en banc denied.) (Plaintiff's position accepted by U.S. Supreme Court in Hunter v. Bryant, 112 S.Ct. 534 , and by Ninth Circuit in Act-Up! Portland v. Bagley, 971 F.2d 298 [9th Cir. 1992].) (Excessive force case.)
Tomer v. Gates, 811 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1987): availability of qualified immunity defense in Section 1983 action is question of law, is immediately appealable collateral order, and defense may be asserted even when law is clearly established if defendant mistakenly believes what he or she did was lawful. (Subsequently tried with defense of immunity, and verdict against defendant for $5,000 compensatory damages and $50,000 punitive damages.) (Set-up of police officer/sting operation case.)
Torres v. Bonilla, 103 F.3d 141 (9th Cir. 1996)(table): police may be held liable legally under Section 1983, based on the Fourteenth Amendment, for injuries sustained by third parties as the result of a police pursuit. (Vehicular pursuit case, bystander plaintiff suffered catastrophic injuries.)
Torres v. Bonilla, 185 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 1999)(table): (same as immediately preceding case): reversing denial of summary judgment to defendants, on ground that conduct did not rise to the new, “shocks the conscience” level. (Vehicular pursuit case, bystander plaintiff suffered catastrophic injuries.)
Valles v. City of Glendale, 894 F.2d 410 (9th Cir. 1990) (table): upholding plaintiff's verdict and award of attorneys' fees to plaintiff. (Excessive force case.)
Willis v. Mullins, 517 F.Supp. 2d 1206 (E.D. Cal. 2007): holding that illegal entry into motel room of person who was not on parole, and without any other legal cause, and that resulted in overturning of conviction that resulted in six years in prison, required that police and state parole officer were not entitled to qualified immunity from suit because the entry was in violation of clearly established law and was not the result of a mistake. (Illegal entry/qualified immunity case.)
Willis v. Mora, 314 F. Appx. 68 (9th Cir. 2009). Court upheld district court's denial of qualified immunity to California state parole officer, holding that the issue of whether her claimed mistake that victim of search was on parole, thereby justifying a warrantless entry into his motel room, was reasonable, was an issue of fact for jury, hence precluding summary judgment.